أنصار بشّار ببنزرت يعتدون على مراسل "خوانجي" و الفوضى تعمّ. بالفيديو و الصّور

07/05/2013

نظّمت الوجوه اليساريّة و القوميّة المعروفة ببنزرت وقفة إحتجاجيّة  على الغارة الإسرائيليّة على سوريا، أمام البلديّة. و قد رفعت شعارات مؤيّدة لبشّار و تمّ الهتاف بوصف أمير قطر بالجبان و رفع لافتات تتهم "الإخوان بالمشاركة بالعدوان". كما تمّ رفع علم بشّار و تحدّث "عمّ الطّاهر" مطوّلا حول كون الثّورة السّوريّة مؤامرة أمريكيّة من مخلّفات تفرّدها بالنّظام العالميّ بعد إنهيار الإتحاد السّوفياتي. 

و أثناء القيام بمهمّة إيصال صوة المحتجّين القلائل إلى الرّأي العام، تمّ الإعتداء عليّ شخصيّا بضرب آلة التّصوير و دفعي إلى الجانب بقوّة من طرف أشخاص مشبوهين بدعم و مؤازرة من بعض الوجوه القائدة للوقفة. و ذلك لإتّهاميّ بأنّني "خوانجي" و لأنّ الأسئلة لم تعجب الحضور.

 و في هذا الأطار أشيد بحماية كلّ سكّان الحديقة من الفقراء لي كما أشكر شابّا يبدو عليه مظهر الإلتزام المشاركة في حمايتي و مواصلة تمتّعي بحقّي كمواطن في بلد الثّورة. كما أنفي أيّ صلة مباشرة بالإخوة الذّين أتوا إلى عين المكان غيرة على حرمة الفضاء العموميّ من الإحتكار و قد إضطررت للمغادرة و لم أتمكّن من مشاهدة نهاية الوقعة. و لكنّ مصادري داخل حزب البعث أبلغتني أنّ التّشنّج أدّى بالوقفة إلى الإنهيار في مشهد عنيف مؤلم. 

و لإن كنت أشيد بكلّ الرّفاق و الإخوة المتدخّلين السّياسيّن أن يكونوا أوّل من يحمي الفضاء العموميّ من مغبّة القمع سواء كان بوليسيّا أو شعبيّا. 

كما أهيب بأعوان الأمن أن يحموا من يبدوا عليهم الإلتزام الدينيّ مظهريّا من إرهاب مجموعات يساريّة معزولة. 

17th of December: A day to celebrate

On this same day, the largest emancipation movement in the century started in the small country of Tunisia. The Arab revolution (spring) is shaping a new world order, where justice gives solid basis to sustainable piece (exp: read about the Gaza seize-fire). 

In this memorable day, we are invited to contemplate the events beyond rhetoric. We are invited to consider where we, as individuals stand. Which side do I identify with? How did I help? All questions worth asking. Happy revolution day.

*for more about the Tunisian revolution: Tunisian revolution: an “epistemological uprising” And a renewed HOPE

**To get informed, involved about the post revolutionary transitions, the ongoing struggles keep following this blog for the next series: "Beyond rhetoric: The state of the Arab-revolution". 

Revolutionary love,

Firas.

Salafism! A question of Progress.

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Popular media tosses the word Salafism as lightly as they dwell on the weather forecast on a nice summer day! The concepts and implication relevant to Salafism suffer from a crude oversimplification. This is further reinforced by the fragility still inherent in the Tunisian start-up democracy and its start-up free press. There is more to Salafists than “salafis are men with beards and white dresses”. There is also more to Salafism than Salafism is reactionary and regressive.

Because I am nice (!!!??? :p) this dogmatic view of a large and diverse group is going to be refuted.

I shall try to keep my essay short enough. The reader will have to excuse me and keep in mind that this is a synopsis of a lengthy philosophical research. If certain arguments or concepts remain obscure, please feel free to contact me for clarifications (being nice again!!??).

General definitions and concepts :

The word Salaf itself technically denotes the righteous muslims during the 300 first years of Islamic history, approximately starting from year 600. This is based on the prophetic saying: ‘’the most righteous people shall live my century, then the one following, then the one following.’’^[1] These people are considered most righteous because of the proximity they enjoy with the prophetic sources.

Salafism in general, is the movement seeking salvation through the guidance and model of the righteous Salaf. Two major subgroups exist within Salafism: Jihadi Salafism, believing that armed struggle is the best way to attain a truly Islamic life. The other branch is Scientific Salafism, which attempts to replicate the logical structures behind Islamic ruling of the Salaf.

Salafism a “progressive force”:

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One of the major attributes to Salafism in Islamic thought is its methodological quest. Early Salafist scholars were faced with growing divides between Islamic philosophies. Thus they attempted to answer these issues with an increased rationality. Salafism’s attempt at formulating a method through which knowledge should be evaluated became the backbone of the “Scientific method” in Islamic thought.

This is a major contribution as Salafism rationalized Islamic thought: Not only were the outcomes of a cogitation to be evaluated, but also the method upon which it was obtained. There is an attempt at creating a universal method, a method that is Godly in nature rather than based on emotional stimulus. In practice, this means that Salafism encourages the use of logical computations. As surprising as it sounds, by attempting to formulate Godly methods of thought, Salafism enables Islamic thought with order and rationality. Another example of this rationality is the disregard for “false battles”: Salafists usually refuse to discuss whether God has a Hand or not…  

Another “progressive” aspect of Salafism in Islamic thought is its unifying drive. Salafism reinforces the monotheistic aspect of Islam. It calls for humans to be freed from the influence of any human power. Salafist have always fought bitterly against attempts to create intermediate powers between subject and their god.  

Moreover, Salafism has a formidable capability to rejuvenate itself. A striking example is the success of the Nour Salafist party in Egypt elections. Salafists in Egypt have refused to adhere to the political process for years. After the revolution it only took a few months for the Nour to organize and win an impressive 2^nd place in the elections. Armed Jihadi Salafist groups have also proved to become increasingly flexible: The “Jihadist movements of Egypt” successfully reviewed their reliance on Violence as a mean for change. So called “revisions” have led the movement to accept, embrace and use cinema and other means that were considered unholy. During the formation of its new democracies, revolutionary countries (Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) need such adaptation prowess in order to reach necessary consensus. 

Salafism a”regressive force”:

Pluralism is still hard to accept for many Salafists. There are tendencies within the movement to negate the legitimacy of other schools of thought. Much of the Salafist discourse assumes that there is no possibility to err or at least that Salafists will always be closer to the truth. When designating themselves, the Salafist phraseology  is a romanticized and idealized one. Words such as the “pure” and the “righteous” and terms relevant to the sacred are used in near self-veneration. This self-veneration, even though it hasn’t reached unsupportable levels, is still dangerous. For if one group starts to believe with too much zeal that their party is incapable of error, errors will not be corrected and the movement becomes destructive both for its environment and itself.   

Often enough, Salafist morality refuses to take into account the advances in different scientific and human studies fields. Thus Judgment of the present is often distorted and outdated. Given the inevitable linguistic changes, the judgments obtained as a result of Salafist methods could indeed be just “what it would have been” 14 centuries ago. “Al Jabri” clearly diagnosed this unhistoricality: “Salafist understanding of heritage in a non-historical one, thus it can only produce only one genre of understanding of heritage: heritage centered one. Heritage contains it but it cannot contain heritage. It is heritage repeating itself. ”

As a way of concluding:

As a relatively new movement to the wider public sphere, Salafists are still underrepresented in public platforms. The use of secondary sources is all too prevalent when issues relate to Salafism.  

There is indeed some truth in the general belief that Salafism is a threat to Islamic societies. Nevertheless, Salafism is a much more complex philosophy with very important progressive sides.

And more broadly: Only time will reveal the constructive potential of the bearded men in white dresses. Or not.
Lebounce
This article is the collection of the central ideas present in IB philosophy EE paper by the author. paper handed in during 2012 to the IBO, author enjoys full copyright.

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[1]  “Salafism, A blessed historical period, not an Islamic branch” by ‘Dr. Mohamed Said Ramadan’ page 9.

تسريبات فيديو الغنّوشي: أخيرا تنكشف الحقيقة

حظي الفيديو المرفق أعلاه باهتمام إعلاميّ منقطع النّظير. و قبل تناول المحتوى فقد أردت أن أعرّج بالقارئ على ظاهرة سياسيّة فريدة في تونس. فالقوى السّياسيّة المعارضة، لم تعي جيّدا أنّ نشر أيّ فيديو لشخصيّة إسلاميّة محوريّة لا يصبّ في مصلحتها الإنتخابيّة. و كما كان الأمر قبيل الإنتخابات السّابقة، فمرّة أخرى تجد النّهضة سبيلها إلى شاشات و ألسن مقترعين محتملين على ظهور المعارضة. أمّا حول صحّة الفيديو من عدمه، و بعد الإطّلاع على ما قدّم على أنّه الفيديو الكامل من طرف المتهّمين، فإنّي أرى صحّته. أؤخّر إحتمال التّزوير لا لإعتبارات تقنيّة بل لأنّ المحتوى الموضوعيّ نفسه لا يشذّ عن المتعارف عليه. 

أمّا حول المحتوى، فهب أن كان الغنّوشي صرّح بأنّ الجيش و الشّرطة و الإدارة علمانيّة و رجعيّة و لا ثوريّة. فأين مكمن العجب و ماهو السّر الذّي كان مطمورا و برز؟ 

في الحقيقة، قول النّهضة أنّ "أقليّات" في أجهزة الدّولة هي فقط المعادية للثّورة هو ما يمكن الطّعن فيه. فيمكن لنا تنزيله منزل المهادنة السّياسيّة و المراعات المرحليّة إن أردنا. لكنّ الواقع يبقى كما هو: أغلب المؤسّسات و خصوصا العاملين فيها من الإطارات السّامية هم من رجالات النّظام السّابق. و تحصين الثّورة ضدّ القوى الرّجعيّة داخل الجيش و الشّرطة و الإدارة واجب شرعيّ بل هو حتميّ لنجاح الثّورة من عدمه. 

أمّا حول الطّبيعة العلمانيّة للنّخب المتنفّذة: إنّ هذا المر مفروغ منه. بن على لم يكن إسلاميّا و لم يستخدم الإسلاميّين و يعطهم المناصب الإداريّة و الإعلاميّة. و هو معلوم لمن أراد أن يتبصّر أن بن على إستخدم نخبا إستئصاليّة يساريّة لتحقيق برامجه الثّقافيّة و التعليميّة و الإعلاميّة. لكنّ هذا ليس شهادة خيانة على كلّ العلمانيّين أو اليساريّين. فليس كلّ من ينتمي لفكر سائد ظالم بظالم كفرد في حدّ ذاته. 

إنّ التعجّب من حقائق ثوريّة بديهيّة كهذه مثير للرّيبة من طرف المشكّكين. كما أتنفّس الصّعداء لأنّ هذا الفيديو كشف أنّ بعضا من النّخب الحاكمة على علم بالتّوازنات الثّوريّة. أي أنّ النّهضة على الأقلّ تعي أنّ أعداء الثّورة متنفّذون هذا الوعي أقلّ الإيمان و يفنّد الشّائعات حول تحالف لها مع التجمعيّين. 

في الإتحاد العام التونسي للشغل بعد 14 جانفي

كتبت و نشرت هذا المقال على الفايسبوك و كان على الأرجح أوّل مقالاتي في فترة ما بعد الثّورة. كوني أنحدر من عائلة نقابيّة مكّنني من إستشعار الخطر الذّي يمثّله الإتّحاد بشكله الحالي على الثّورة و هو ما نعيش فصوله اليوم. نشر بتاريخ 15 جوان 2011

يوم 20 جانفي 1946 تأسسَت إحدى أهم المنظمات في التاريخ التونسي الحديث : ''الإتحاد العام التٌونسي للشغل''.

ارتبطت بالمنظمة أسماء لرموز للحركة الوطنيَة من أجل الإستقلال، أمثال ''فرحات حشَاد'' و غيره. اغتيل بعضهم تلبية لمصالح استعمارية أحيانا و أحيانا أخرى مصالح لقيادات ''الدَاخل''. كما ناضل جلهم(و الله أعلم) فاكتسب الإتحاد شرعية مكنته من البقاء اللاعب المجتمعيّ الأبرز على ساحات ''دولة الاستقلال''.

تمكّن الإتّحاد من ''البقاء'' بشكل شبيه بشكله في 1965 مع تعديلات و إضافات محدودة. فلنلقي نظرة على هدا ''الشكل''(التركيبة) :

للإتحاد 13 قسما. لكل منها أمينها العام المساعد، 5 منها تنظيمية بحتة لا تمارس أي عمل نقابي بل تعنى بالتضام داخل المنضمة. أما الهياكل فهي كثيرة، ثلاث مجالس متراتبة و مكتب تنفيذي تتفرع عنه 18 جسما من مجالس و لجان و مجاميع. 5 منها كذلك لتنظيم عمل أل 13 الأخرى. 

 لا يخفى إدا تشعب و تضخم تشكيلة الإتحاد. و لسائل أن يسأل أين مكان العمل النقابي بين تعقيدات "البيروقراطية النقابية"؟ بيروقراطية نقابية؟ تناقض لغوي بل مبدئي شديد.

و هنا مربط الفرس: البيروقراطية (خلال سنوات الجمر) مع تضخم المداخيل أديا لا محالة إلى تحول النضال النقابي إلى ''عمل نقابي'' بأتم معنى الكلمة. سيارات و سواق و منافع ل''ممثلي'' القطاعات الشغَّيلة. أما عن الفساد المالي واستغلال النفوذ فلا داعي لإثباته عسى الأجهزة التنظيميةو التّأديبيّة (الكثيرة) من داخل الإتحاد أن تعالجه و لا هو بموضوع حديثنا هدا.

فماذا عسانا فاعلين لتطوير المنظومة النقابية لجعلها مواكبة لتونس ما بعد الثورة؟ من أدرى بمصالح عمال في مؤسسة ما غير هؤلاء العمال أنفسهم؟

اللامركزية النّقابيّة هي الحل. يختار عمال كل مؤسسة ممثليهم المتطوعين اللذين يقتصر دورهم على تلك المؤسسة. فلا داعي لبقية الهياكل في دولة القانون. لا يحتاج العمال في دولة تحمي فيها القوانين حقوق المواطنين إلى الإستقواء على رأس المال، بل هم أحوج إلى التّكامل معه لتحقيق الرخاء.

يمكن أن تبقى الأمانة العامة فقط كهيكل منسق داعم وممثل بالمحافل الدولية العمالية. ولا تتدخل بشكل مباشر  بالنقابات ناهيك عن السياسة. 

أوجه إدا ندائي إلى الأمانة العامة و مختلف كوادر منظمتنا العريقة أن يقوموا بالخطوة الجريئة: حل الإتحاد بشكله الحالي و إعادة تشكيله كما تقدم.

عاش الإتحاد حرا مستقلا و ديمقراطيا و مناضلا.

   المصادر: موقع الإتحاد الرسمي على النت

Tunisian revolution: an “epistemological uprising” And a renewed HOPE

14th of January: in the coastal Tunisian city Of Bizerte

   It has taken me a lot of courage to start writing this piece and that is for a good reason. In fact, in a previous article[1] that I have published in “nawaat” I have explored some difficulties associated with trials at “defining” the Tunisian revolution and at developing a “standard phraseology” to denote it. An example of the latter is the fact that Tunisians still disagree about the sheer attribution of a “name” to the revolution, with differences ranging from “Jasmine revolution” all the way to “dignity revolution”. In that article I rather took a diplomatic and modest stance by merely calling for the initiation of a serious effort to create these definition and phraseology. On this article on the other hand I will explain my perception about the matter and hopefully participate with a brick in the building of a better understanding of what has happened in this country since the deposed president fled.

Let us start with the easiest part in this inquiry and use a proof-by-the-absurd method. Meaning that first I will examine what the revolution is indubitably not: The most popular “definition” that I think ought to be refuted is the cyber revolution claim. Many western and local commentators have called the events starting from the 17^th of December a Twitter or a Facebook revolution. The very cyber (or for the matter unreal) nature of these mediums demonstrates that they are not, alone, capable of encompassing all the aspects of the Tunisian revolution. There are rather the communication outlet and branch of the revolution: Not the revolution itself.

Another obvious observation is the weak ideological motivation of the crowds participating in the protests. The enemy was clear: RCD, Ben Ali and his clan per say, but the protesters did not have a clear idea of a precise dogma or established view on government that they fought for. Instead, the slogans focused on Freedom, social justice and Employment. These broad Slogans enabled people from various Ideological convictions, with differences amounting sometimes to enmities, to participate in the revolutionary effort hand in hand.

A controversial and less mentioned aspect, that I believe should be addressed nonetheless, is the “popular” involvement in the revolution. The question here is how popular was the revolution really? Even though unprecedented popular involvement proved to be a decisive factor, I believe we can only talk about a limited number or activists. By activists I mean people who had participated in the revolution not for motives of anger or moved by reprisal and retaliation for the death of a loved one or so. People who in fact have participated and organized because of purer belief in the cause of ousting the repressive regime founded by the president Bourguiba and consolidated by his successor Ben Ali. Amar Arfaoui is an active participant in the revolutionary effort of Bizerte.      He affirms that the number of protesters in Bizerte until the 14^th of January was actually little. In fact, he thinks 30 persons was the peak number they managed to gather. The picture on top this article (Amar arfaoui in green in the center of the image) shows what is thought to be the largest rally of protesters in Bizerte, a city of 230 000 citizens and yet, even after Ben Ali has fled, one can see that popular involvement had serious weaknesses in some cases.  

These previous points are in no way discrediting the merit of revolutionaries and activists. I rather mentioned them to show that no one specific dogma can be applied to the Tunisian revolution and “explain it”. It does not fit any previous models such as a communist revolution or an Islamist revolution. Yet, something really big and monumental happened in Tunisia:

An incredible arrangement of circumstances along with the heroic courage and bravery of protesters led to what I chose to call an “epistemological uprising”. Tunisia and the region in general, has been living on the margins of history for centuries. Meaning that we (as a collective), have left the sphere of actors in world history and succumbed to decadence or mere imitation of European powers. In Nietzschian terms, we have seized to be in the natural process of “becoming” and more or less froze as amazed bewilders in a culture that is not compatible with our natural development of costumes and ideas . On the other hand, after the revolution, we have succeeded to reenter “life” and the very basic struggle for freedom in its widest sense. We have not accomplished a dogmatic transition from monarchy to republicanism or from capitalism to socialism. Rather we have opted to have a chance at making that transition.

 The revolution did change some ontological realities and the biggest of which is the democratic process in itself and all the freedoms associated with it. Nevertheless I call it an epistemological uprising because it more importantly changed the Tunisian individual and communal way of considering the world and gain knowledge about it: Considering the world as an ongoing “becoming” and viewing oneself as an active participant in that process are all examples of novel notions for Tunisians. One can even call it in simple terms: HOPE. For maybe we have not achieved all the objectives and aspirations of the revolution but one can dare to hope that we will.

In my Opinion, the Tunisian Revolution is synonymous for hope and life. 

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[1] http://nawaat.org/portail/2011/06/18/crise-definition-revolution-tunisie/

How a wide income gap squeezes happiness

  Even though economics is much about the study of ways of increasing welfare, studies of the effects of widening income gaps in the developing world are often watering down the negative effects claiming that the “trickle-down” effect is bound to happen at some point in the longer run (“when we are all dead” Keynes).

A much more subtle argument waiving income gap as a substantial threat to development, is that the bulk of people in most lower developed countries LDC have witnessed increasing incomes even though much of that wealth has accumulated in the hands of the few richest. In other words the situation of the entire groups concerned has improved in terms of income.

Nevertheless a more “obscure” negative effect is undermined by this dialectic: The effect of income gap widening on the collective happiness. It is obscure in the sense that it would be difficult to establish objective quantitative measures.

The Idea came to me at a pre-graduation party with my schoolmates in Italy. Almost all my Scandinavian friends were wearing the traditional graduate’s hat. One of them, from Denmark, told me jokingly that with this very hat he can do whatever he wants to do: work in a restaurant, travel or even study biochemistry.

But in that innocent joke lies the essence of a very fundamental economic difference between most developing and some developed countries: Income gap “width”. In fact the differences (or the genii coefficient for the matter) in wages between the highest and the lowest paying jobs in Denmark is actually negligible compared to that in my home country of Tunisia. According to the CIA’s GINI index table, published as part of the “world fact book”, Tunisia ranks 63 with a 40% gini index while Denmark only comes in rank 137 with a much lower income disparity represented by a 24.8% gini index.^[1]

And this fact has serious implications not only on the job market structure but on the entire perception of one’s life. My friend would have been just fine (income wise) if he had been a waiter. For him opportunity is not a rare and colossal chance but it is the norm. Thus my friend will go on a gap year: He will work for a few months and then go on to travel and meet friends and plainly just relax. That is not the case for only my friend, but generally for the whole generation of Scandinavians! And I hope the reader is not mistaken, the school he is about to graduate from is an International institution and yet his “ambitions”, even though greatly open and flexible, are “easy” and simple.

Now if we consider mine and my similar companions’ case. Almost all my friends from LDC will go on to study a “Hard” science or course in an American College. In this we are very lucky as the USA’s higher education’s system is rich and can accommodate many international students on very high scholarship coverage. This is the case for a very lucky (because the number of talented “poor” people will always be less than the number of “poor” people selected to study in a world class higher institutions) elite of LDC students, and still the difference in life prospects and style will differ: The constant “threat” of expulsion or simple removal of scholarship will push these students to perform as best as can be performed when it comes to academia matters. Upon completion of education there will be a haunting quest for a job in the country of study or the MDC in general. This quest will go beyond simple search for the best work conditions possible: For “us” it is also about family honor, about skipping some steps of the social ladder and at the base of it all for pure survival.

Consider now, the overwhelming majority of people in LDC: The majority that did not get lucky enough to study or rather escape to a MDC. In this arena, everybody still wants and strives to be doctors, engineers, ministers and most likely presidents (if they are lucky to be in politically developed LDC in the first place). Firstly that places enormous pressure on the weak higher educational institution. Secondly, all “technical” manual jobs related schools are viewed by society almost as a pre-jail school. I recall that a middle school, in my natal Tunisian city of Bizerte, is branded with the very degrading nickname of “Donkey school” (literally and in English). It is denoted so just because an entire generation ago it was home to a technical school. At the end of the educational very competitive process, economies that are largely based on primary and secondary sectors are not suitable to accommodate the influx of university graduates. From this emerges a very peculiar “structural underemployment”: There are too many wannabe doctors and presidents and there are only a few posts to fill. The Tunisian university graduate unemployment figures are one of the most daunting examples of this catastrophic turnout. Most likely most of the undesired graduates will end up doing the simple jobs anyway: this time around, they will be untrained and their existential satisfaction will be forever shattered.

What we have here is a far too large number of underemployed depression-prone somehow young but still wasted very central years in the alleles of corrupt universities: and that is a catastrophic turnout is. A wide income gap produces the carrot (well-paying jobs) and the stick (manual low paying labor). This is equally as disastrous in outcomes to the society as a whole. For the risk is placed on the existential wellbeing of the whole society. 

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[1] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html