What am I? the question remains.

The title of this book for little children is the classical but extremely decisive and fundamental question of “what…am I?” The search for a stable consistent definition of the core substance or essence of the “I” in what I “was, am and will be, has been a persistent search. No matter how many theories and “definitions” are elaborated the question seems to rather intensify in all fields of human related studies. Even though the question itself is hard to answer, one could see why it would be important to establish the nature of the “I” and how it would lead ultimately to a general definition or at least view of the collective “WE” as an addition of “self-s” or an enlargement of the individual self as Plato would suggest. By suggesting a conflict between body, soul, the self and the mind the text proposes key philosophical issues dealing with the primary question of the “who am I?”

In the following inquiry, I will develop an argument resting on the contrast between rationalist and empiricist views on the matter at hand. I will therefore start with Cartesianism then Berkleism to end with John Locke.

Cartesianism, being a moderate rational view, proposes rather sensible epistemological methods about the substances that can be known indubitably. In fact it is based on the conviction that the “wondering subject” or person undergoing the action of wondering cannot wander about whether he was doing the wondering. Even if he was to wander so, he would inevitably be the wonderer in all cases. It is not relevant here neither the complexity nor the length any mental process that “myself” undertakes, I can indubitably and abjectly cogitate that “I” and not any extraneous elements is the doer of that cognitive activity.

Quite logically it arrives at the inevitable conclusion of the definition of the “I” as the thinking substance that is undergoing all processes of perception and operates other faculties of imagining and such. It is indeed hard to argue that this conclusion is fallacious: For the basis of the methodology is a combination of strict “rules” and methodological skepticism. The application of gradual skeptical hypothesis seems to be comprehensive even in the face of the strongest skepticism like the “evil genius” who would be constantly deceiving us. The presence of god is then introduced as the guaranty that senses are not being corrupted and manipulated which in turn allows cartesianism to reconstruct the ontological realities that the thinking substance or the I is evolving in.

Nevertheless a fundamental incoherence or inconvenience arises from this view of the world and this interpretation of the self. A “handicapped” Dualism that cannot find the proper answer to questions relating to the relationship between material objects and the Res Cogitans (the thinking substance stated above) such that asked by the text “am I identical with my mind? Body?”. Moreover one can debate whether the results of the hyperbolic doubt are not in themselves assumptions that could be doubted as well. Another is the evaluation of the extent to which Descartes has obeyed his own method’s rules? For example the idea of the Res infinita, even though providing a basis for the two other Cartesian basic substances, can be, in my opinion, “filtered” through another skeptical hypothesis, that of doubting the basic assumption that god is perfect. A Cartesian might as well respond to this question by asserting that even in this case, one cannot deny that the self is continuously the substance existing and performing this skeptical supposition. Then I think that certain extremes of cartesianism are erroneous in the sense they lapse in a solipsism that prevents progress and communal and social thought but rather is confined in the self alone.

Berkeley, on the other hand, attempts to eradicate this problematic incoherence radically. He proposes that material substances are quasi non-existent as it is impossible to establish their existence beyond doubt. He claims that while an object is being perceived in the present than it could be argued to be in existence or existing whereas when it stops to be currently perceived it would be an object that existed rather than exists. For example, regarding my computer I can currently sense, feel and maybe smell (if it overheats as it does sometimes) it and thus I can perceive its existence. If I was to leave my study then I can only say that I know indubitably that my computer existed. What is left in this analogy according to Berkeley is that there are only Ideas. He continues on this path to explain and outline that Ideas can only be either true Ideas, making them implanted by God, or they can be false Ideas and thus classified as humanly created and imaginary.  

Nevertheless the manner in which bishop Berkeley has dealt with Descartes’ dualism and the problems and inconsistencies it produces, seems more like a plain simplification and re-interpretation. The advances in physics and related areas for example, show us that objects that are located “far” away by our human metric standards, can be demonstrated or discovered mathematically before an actual sense-like perception of their existence is established. The end result of this thought process is a monism rather than the Cartesian dualism. It seems that following on this path a Berkeley like interpretation of the existing substances of the world would produce a universe of extreme uncertainty in the sense that we would be in a very limited “setting” if we are only accepting the existence of nearby objects.   An obvious answer and reply to this view is that Berkley by eradicating the existence of material objects on the personal basis, is rather avoiding the issues and questions arising from his rational radical views. All what is being advanced forth is then avoidance and not answers to the question of Cartesian style dualism. The use of a divinity in this case reposes on more assumptions than in the Cartesian method: For here we have a God that guarantees the basic ontological ground for the world whereas with Descartes the god being mentioned only guarantees that we are not deceived in our sense perceptions. 

I personally believe that John Locke is the most tangible and thorough about the issues of selfhood than both Berkeley and Descartes.

John Locke provides a convenient and efficient philosophical break with the handicapping dualism dilemma that Descartes’ methods on the matter of selfhood presents: Locke proposes that consciousness cannot and must not be uncompelled from whichever substance it is attached to. In the light of this proposition, personhood or the “I” cannot be disengaged from any cognitive activity or ideas.

In addition Locke asserts that “the perception of the relationship between various Ideas” is the definition of knowledge rather then that of the self. By advancing this concept as such, Locke reduces Berkeley’s interpretation of the reality as a whole, his concepts of true Godly ideas and of humanly invented imagination. He reduces it from its status to a probable component of a knowledge theory. This in turn frees the way for the definition of selfhood and conscious and the “knower” himself. John Locke proposes then that the concept of personal identity can be identified through the necessary conditions or the mind faculty or memory.

Memory and the remembering of moments when “myself” or “I” was aware of my personhood is used to formulate or state a view or idea about that person, my “person”.  Nevertheless Locke specified a specific nature and cast for the memory that is suitable for this definition. A class of memory that he especially dismisses are short term memories that express trivialities and habitual automatic-like action. The fact that it is” a few hours until morning as am writing this essay and that I will go to bed right upon completion and hope I would not have a terrible headache tomorrow and try to drink water to fight the ache” would all fall in this category. Statements such as “When I spent a year alone in 1996 in the wilderness I developed an acute sense of my being while having to shield myself from predators all the time” even though is exaggerated but would be considered a long term important memory. A strong argument supporting this view is that ultimately what one remembers himself as, genuinely, to be must be what he is. One is inevitably what he thinks he is, I am what I think and remember myself to be. Applying a skeptical counter claim such as the possibility of the memory being erroneous does not seem to weaken this notion. For the world is seen throughout each individual’s eyes, perceptions and Ideas which makes every single person’s world an environment that revolves around them (no matter how they remember themselves to be).

An apparent weakness, in my opinion, is that Locke’s empirical view could be the other side or extreme of Berkley regarding Descartes’ view. It could be said to be in turn a monism of the ontological conclusion of typical cartesianism. This means that a relationship can be drawn between the three methods as follows: Cartesianism proposed a material realm and an “Ideas” realm, Berkeley “negated” the material part while Locke did the same with the “Ideas” part of the method.

As a way of conclusion I think that it is most useful to note that John Locke’s views seem to be more attractive because of the realism and tangibility of his Ideas. Nevertheless, Descartes’ Res Cogitans retains a lot of appeal at least from the view point of the rigorous methodology and the operation of the methodological skepticism. It is then most appropriate to end by stating that there are no definite answers but that the questions will always remain.

My Ib philosophy course internal paper